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Abstract
During the Soeharto Era corruption was considered to grease the wheels of growth in Indonesia, a country once
considered to be the most corrupt country in the world. Indonesia began to experience instantaneous decentralization
and democratization after the Soeharto Era abruptly ended. While vastly celebrated, these episodes have their
unintended consequence: coercive regulation. We employed the extensive firm-level Large and Medium Manufacturing
(Industri Besar Sedang/IBS) census data combined with the Indonesian Democracy Index (Indeks Demokrasi
Indonesia/IDI) at provincial level spanning from 2009 to 2015 and found that bribery hampered Indonesian firm output
and productivity growth by 9.8% and 12.6%, respectively. These results suggest that the greasing effect has now
diminished. Interestingly, we also found that firms located in a province with a better democracy index may experience
less damaging effects of corruption. In other words, two firms paying the same value of bribe may obtain different effects
depending on where they are located.
Keywords: bribery; greasing-the-wheels hypothesis; firm performance; democracy; decentralization
JEL classifications: D72; D73; O14

1. Introduction

tion in Indonesia, allowed regions to travel divergent
paths both politically and economically.

What happens if the strongman of a country falls?
Qadhafi’s reign ended in 2011 when the Arab
Springs came to Libya. Libya soon fell into a total disarray, and economic activities mostly halted
(Darendeli & Hill 2016). Dininio & Orttung (2005)
describe that the collapse of the Soviet Union led
to extensive decentralization in Russia. People directly elected governors from the mid-1990s until
the end of 2004 in regions within Russia, resulting
in divergence in political and economic regimes. In
1998, Indonesia’s ruler of three decades, Soeharto,
stepped down from power amid economic catastrophe and a massive corruption scandal. Soeharto’s
fall, followed by democratization and decentraliza∗ Corresponding Address: Jl. M. I. Ridwan Rais No. 5, Jakarta
Pusat 10110 Gedung Utama Lt. 7. Email: suratirfan@gmail.com.

Doing business and corruption in an autocratic
regime is relatively simpler, as it is always clear
who needs to be bribed and how much is involved
(Shleifer & Vishny 1993). In Libya during Qadhafi’s
regime, for multi-national companies (MNEs) with
close ties to Qadhafi, the arrangements and costs
were rather predictable and manageable. All knew
what one ‘had to do’ (Darendeli & Hill 2016). While
in Russia during the Soviet Union era, bribes were
channeled through local communist party offices
and any deviation would be punished by the party’s
system, resulting in very few deviations (Shleifer &
Vishny 1993). These practices are somehow similar to Indonesia under Soeharto, when corruption
tended to be centralized and predictable (Bardhan
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1997; McLeod 2000). Soeharto managed a better
level of corruption by always taking the long-term
view (McLeod 2000). Therefore, undoubtedly corruption in this era benefitted firm performance in
Indonesia (Rock & Bonnett 2004; Vial & Hanoteau
2010).
The fall of Soeharto was followed by massive democratization and decentralization. The democratization process was marked by the direct election for
president in 2004 and governors and mayors and
regents in 2005. In 1999 there were 26 provinces
and 293 districts (Kabupaten/Kota), while now there
are 34 provinces and 514 districts. Decentralization
and the local democratic process enable officials
to regulate their region by issuing regional regulations (Perda). The Perda itself has been found
to be coercive. A study in 2017 found up to 71%
of Perda suffered time, cost, and procedure haziness, while 64% brought about negative economic
effects (KPPOD 2017). Therefore, it is necessary
to investigate the impact of corruption on firm performance during this timeframe given the paucity of
such research.
Our main research objective is to re-examine the impact of corruption on firm performance in Indonesia
in the post-Soeharto context. In the post-Qadhafi
era, firms that have strong ties with local leaders
and bureaucrats are likely to survive (Darendeli &
Hill 2016). In Indonesia, it is predicted that the official number of bribe-takers will tend to increase
and corruption will be more detrimental to economic
efficiency (McLeod 2000). Kuncoro (2006) argues
decentralization in Indonesia exacerbates bribe collection system as the fragmentation and uncertainty
escalate.
Corruption is universally condemned, but criticism
that is based on simply moralizing-explicit or latent self-interest, or ideology, can be an obstacle
to rational analysis (Leff 1964). Empirically, there
are two competing findings on corruption impact
that strongly depict an ambivalent relationship between the private sector (firms) and the government. Firms detest corruption as it sands their
performance. Studies have found negative effects

of corruption on the economy and business in
many countries around the world (e.g., Bbaale &
Okumu 2018; Fisman & Svensson 2007; Jain 2020;
Kaufmann & Wei 2000; Lambsdorff 2003; Mauro
1995; McArthur & Teal 2002; Rose-Ackerman 2004;
Seker & Yang 2012). However, corruption remains
a common practice in doing business (CuervoCazurra 2006,2016; Rose-Ackerman 2004). Corruption can help firms especially those operating in
areas with low government institution quality (Jiang
& Nie 2014; Krammer 2019; Méon & Weill 2010;
Rock & Bonnett 2004; Vial & Hanoteau 2010).
Previous studies on the impact of corruption generally focus on inter-country comparison. Few studies
have focused on the impact of corruption on interjurisdiction within a country, especially after a political transition. Our study aims to fill this gap using
the Indonesian context. This article aims to explore
how local institution may affect the impact of corruption. North (1991) postulated that institution and
standard economic constraints determine transaction and production costs and hence the profitability
and feasibility of engaging in economic activity. The
literature on corruption suggests that the net effect
of corruption depends on institution quality (De Vaal
& Ebben 2011; Huntington 1968; Méon & Sekkat
2005; Méon & Weill 2010). Decentralization has allowed each region in Indonesia to operate as a unit
of an entire democratic institution. The dynamics of
the instantaneous decentralization approach have
created variable performance in different provinces
as a result of variations in the institutional establishment, leadership, and political culture (Gismar
2011). Accordingly, this study aims to explore the
interaction of the quality of local democracy and
corruption and their impact on firm performance.
This subject in the Indonesian context, to our best
knowledge, remains underexplored.
This study builds on Vial & Hanoteau’s (2010) findings stating that corruption has a positive and
statistically significant effect on firm growth in Indonesia during the Soeharto Era. We aim to reexamine the hypothesis using firm-level data after
the Soeharto Era ended and political institutions
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radically changed. Our analysis of corruption in
the decentralization setting is based on Shleifer
& Vishny (1993) and Henderson & Kuncoro (2004).
Therefore, our study shares the same logic of inquiry as previous studies examining the relationship
of corruption and firm performance (e.g., McArthur
& Teal 2002; Fisman & Svensson 2007; Méon &
Weill 2010; Seker & Yang 2012; Bbaale & Okumu
2018; Cuervo-Cazurra 2016; Krammer 2019; Jain
2020).
Understanding a wide range of definitions of corruption is our first challenging task. Rose-Ackerman
(2008, p. 551) defines corruption as “the misuse of
public office for private gain” while Transparency International (2020) proposes a broader definition:
“the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”
Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford Languages
2018) defines corruption as “dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving
bribery.” In this article, we focus on bribery as the
most common form of corruption involving firms
and officials. Accordingly, the term corruption refers
to bribery in the remainder of this article. We do
not especially focus on high-profile bribery cases;
rather we are interested in the common practice of
bribery – grassroot bribery.
Transparency International ranked Indonesia as
the country with the highest corruptions perception index in 1995. Since then, Indonesia has been
through many major episodes of democratization.
However, corruption remains a salient feature the
Indonesian economy. For businesses, corruption
remains to be the most problematic factor in doing
business (WEF 2018). At the same time, the manufacturing sector in Indonesia suffers some signs
of deindustrialization, including a decline in manufacturing output and export, and labor productivity
(Hastiadi & Nurunnisa 2017).
This article is organized as follows. The next section,
Section 2, presents a review of relevant theories
and previous studies. Section 3 describes the data
and methodology used in the study. Section 4 discusses the findings, and the final section presents
the conclusion.

125

2. Literature Review
2.1. Theories of Bribery
To understand corruption within a relatively new
decentralization and local democracy in Indonesia,
the theory by Shleifer & Vishny (1993) is deemed
suitable. According to this theory, the government
is the purveyor of government goods (e.g., permits,
licenses) and firms are the buyer. Within this setup,
the government has the power to monopolize the
goods. This setting is applicable in old monarchies
or communist regimes, akin to the New Order Era;
the buyers always knew whom to bribe and how
much they wanted. As the bribe was handed, the
buyer received the goods. The chance of not securing the goods was very slim due to the strong
control by the regime. However, in many countries,
many agencies or local government can create laws
and regulations which allow them to extract rents.
This setup often leads to the failure of collusion between the monopolists resulting in more uncertainty
and bribery can not be sustained (Kuncoro 2006;
McLeod 2000).
The above illustration depicts Indonesia’s institutional setting in the Reformation Era. The
New Order collapse has enabled decentralization
and democracies to flourish to varying degrees.
Henderson & Kuncoro (2004) conducted a seminal
study on corruption in Indonesia in the decentralization setting. In their model, they argue that there
is a correspondence between bribe and regulation
burden. A firm will bribe local officials to lessen
harassment and red tape and will negotiate with
them in the process. The firm has to deal with the
uncertainty of the promised service delivery. When
there are too many officials or agencies who can
determine the outcome, the bribery system is highly
uncertain. The firm’s willingness to pay bribes is a
function of government-related harassment or red
tape and uncertainty besides the firm’s characteristics, such as firm size, ownership, sector, and
location.
Henderson & Kuncoro (2004) extended the model
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by introducing inter-jurisdiction competition, which
states that high bribes tend to repel firms from a
region. They argue that bribe demand by government officials is a function of some proxy attitude
towards businesses. If officials have a longer-term
outlook, they would tend to value long-term income
since they see businesses as profitable enterprise
(Kuncoro 2006). In this setting, bribe demand may
not be too excessive and relatively predictable. On
the contrary, if officials choose a short-sighted strategy, bribes tend to be excessively high yet with
highly uncertain outcomes. The positive relationship between red tape and bribe ratio indicates
local officials’ effort to extract rents by the means of
regulations. This also increases the time needed by
the firm to deal with the local officials to get things
done.

2.2. Bribery Effects: Beneficial Grease
or Harmful Sand?
Previous studies on the effects bribery revealed an
ambivalent relationship between firms and the government. Findings on whether corruption (bribery)
has positive (greasing) or negative (sanding) effects
on the economy and business remain inconclusive.
Leff (1964) argues that corruption can incentivize
officials and induce the government to take a more
favorable stand on economic activity. Breton (1974)
and Huntington (1968) agree that corruption can
serve as the second-best strategy to mitigate coercion or cumbersome regulations. Huntington (1968)
added that in a political transition and poor institutions corruption tends to increase. The nuance
of the bribe’s positive effect strongly depends on
institutional quality. De Vaal & Ebben (2011) support this hypothesis, and according to their model,
in the institutional vacuum setting corruption tends
to bring about negative impact. However, when the
institutional setting is taken into account, the destructive effect of corruption only starts to emerge
above a certain threshold. This implies that in a relatively low quality institution, corruption may serve
as a grease.

In another line of research, several studies focused
on firm-level impact. Williams, Martinez-Perez &
Kedir (2016) analyzed data from more than 100,000
firms from 132 developing countries and found that
bribes did enhance firm performance. Jiang & Nie
(2014) show that corruption helps private firms circumvent regulations and score more profit in China.
Krammer (2019) argues that bribery may help firms
overcome bureaucratic obstacles during the introduction of new products as a result of bureaucratic
obstacles and uncertainty, especially when they exhibit a lack of political affiliation.
The greasing hypothesis, however, does not remain
uncontested. Fisman & Svensson (2007) show that
bribery is negatively correlated with firm growth.
Other studies also argue that corruption is hampering firm productivity (Bbaale & Okumu 2018;
McArthur & Teal 2002). The extent of the negative
effect of corruption on firm growth varies. Each percent increase in bribe correlates with a 3% lower
firm growth in Uganda (Fisman & Svensson 2007),
and a 24% sales decrease in Latin America and the
Caribbean region (Seker & Yang 2012). Moreover,
corruption has been found to be more detrimental
to smaller firms (Jain 2020; Seker & Yang 2012;
Zhou & Peng 2012).
In the Indonesian context, Vial & Hanoteau’s (2010)
findings support the greasing hypothesis. During
the Soeharto era, bribery was sustained because it
was followed by long-standing trust relations. Bribes
paid off, as firms received service and secured access to productive resources for which they they
bribed. This supports McLeod’s (2000) claim that
the Soeharto regime extracted rents while keeping the economy growing so that the ‘tax base’ increased and therefore kept him in power.

2.3. Local Democracy and Corruption
A firm may use financial incentives including committing bribery as business political strategies to
influence political stakeholders’ actions (Hillman &
Hitt 1999; Holtbrügge, Berg & Puck 2007). This is
certainly not a novel practice. In the long past mer-
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chants paid protection money to the local prince or
even local coercive group (North 1991).
There is a strong view that decentralization and
local democracy is negatively correlated with corruption because politicians can be directly held accountable for their actions since they are closer to
their constituents (Fisman & Gatti 2002; Treisman
2000). Democracy as a political institution has a
mechanism that enables people to change leaders
through an election. This setting allows the corrupt
leader to be removed from power as a disciplining
effect mechanism (Aidt, Dutta & Sena 2008). Such
disciplining effect is arguably the most important
feature in democracy and has been found in Indonesia. During the second wave of elections in the
Reformasi Era (2004), districts that experienced a
spike in corruption punished the secular party by a
massive vote loss (Henderson & Kuncoro 2011).

3. Method
3.1. The Model
Several previous studies treat bribe payment as
an endogenous variable (e.g., Fisman & Svensson
2007; Mauro 1995; Shleifer & Vishny 1993). Better
performing or fast-growing firms may become targets of harassment or red tape, while at the same
time those firms are more likely to have a higher
willingness to pay bribes. The firm’s manager may
also choose bribery as a strategy to deter competitors or achieve a higher profit or growth. There is
also the possibility of omitted variable bias from unobservable firm characteristics such as corporate
culture.

127

ment (bijt) are assumed to be determined by two aspects, the firm characteristics and external factors
related to the industry sector and location (industrylocation cluster).
bijt = Bijt + Bjt

(1)

Bijt is the bribe payment component idiosyncratic
to firm i within industry-location cluster j and year
t. Bjt is the bribe payment component justified by
industry-location specific such as local regulation,
infrastructure dependency, local culture, official behavior, and other local conditions.
The value of bijt (fitted value) is generated from the
first-stage estimation using the equation below:
bijt

=

α0 + α1 BAvgjt + α2 BStdjt
+α3 Kwhijt + αXijt + εijt

(2)

BAvgjt is the average bribe payment industrylocation cluster j year t, and BStdjt is the deviation
of bribe payment industry-location cluster j year t.
As it will be plausible to assume that firm bribe payment is exogenously affected by bribe customary
(average) and uncertainty (deviation) within the location or industry sector, we add Kwhijt as another
excluded instrument to have two overidentifying IVs.
Following Fisman & Svensson (2007) and Vial &
Hanoteau (2010), Kwhijt is a variable measuring
electricity sold by a firm, indicating the quality of
its infrastructure. Xijt is the control variable of firm
characteristics such as firm size and the presence
of foreign investment.
Our second stage or empirical model becomes:
Yijt = β0 + β1 b̂ijt + βXijt + εijt

(3)

This study follows Fisman & Svensson (2007) who
pioneered the use of a two-stage estimation using
industry-location average bribes as an instrument
variable. This strategy has been employed by numerous studies (e.g., Bbaale & Okumu 2018; Jain
2020; Jiang & Nie 2014; Krammer 2019; Vial &
Hanoteau 2010).

Yijt is the performance measure (output growth and
productivity growth) estimated using fitted values
that capture the exogenous bribe payment. We created an alternative specification to capture the interaction effect of bribe payment and quality of democracy. Our specification becomes:

The firm’s decision and the amount of bribe pay-

Yijt = β0 + β1 b̂ijt + β2 b̂ijt ∗ IDIjt + βXijt + εijt (4)
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We estimated the above specification using Panel
Data – Two-Stage Least Square IV regression
method.

3.2. Data and Variables
3.2.1. Data
Any study on corruption is subject to issues related
to reliable data collection. It is extremely difficult to
collect corruption data as the activity is illicit and
confidential. It deters the respondent from providing data or answers because they could face legal
implications (Fisman & Svensson 2007; Henderson
& Kuncoro 2004; Heredia et al. 2020). Therefore,
studies normally resort to a proxy or an indirect
question to measure corruption.
We use the 2009–2015 Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics (Statistik Industri Besar Sedang,
hereafter IBS). IBS is a firm-level data collected annually by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS)
that enumerates manufacturing firms with a minimum of 20 employees. The census is anonymous to
increase the accuracy of the data and firms’ willingness to share information. We use the variable that
falls under questions related to expenses for gifts,
charitable contributions, and donations as proxy
for bribery measurement. We argue this is appropriate as bribe relationship in Indonesia is usually
disguised under the pretext of gift exchange between colleagues or among “friends” rather than
to be seen as a fraudulent practice (Henderson &
Kuncoro 2004, p. 5). This proxy is in line with the
empirical model that predicts the firm’s decision and
amount of gift or donation are motivated by other
firms’ behavior within the same sector and location.
However, it is fair to mention that assuming all firms
that reported this item cost as corrupt is not fully
accurate as some of them may have in fact been
genuine gifts.
The same proxy is also employed by Behrman &
Deolalikar (1989) and Vial & Hanoteau (2010). The
proxy is also compatible with the Indonesian anticorruption law (i.e., Law number 31 of 1999 and
the amendment) that includes three types of giving,

namely gratuities, bribery and facilitation payments,
and extortion.
The second data source is the Indonesian Democracy Index (Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia, hereafter
IDI) at the provincial level, the smallest level currently available. IDI is an objective and empirical
measurement of democracy (Rauf et al. 2011) and
designed to be sensitive to changes in aspects of
democracy (BPS 2016). IDI consists of three main
aspects, namely civil liberties (ten indicators), political rights (seven indicators), and the institution
of democracy (eleven indicators). IDI indicators are
inspired by the conception and operationalization
of democratic indicators used by Freedom House
(Amri & Pasha 2020). IDI score is calculated from
four data sources, local newspaper review, regulation review (e.g., Perda, Pergub), focus group discussion, and in-depth interview. We combined IBS
data with IDI to compile our panel dataset and managed to collate a dataset spanning from 2009 (the
starting year of IDI) to 2015.
3.2.2. Variables
We measured firm performance using two variables,
namely output growth and labor productivity, obtained from IBS. Both variables are generated by
differenciating (t minus t-1) log value of output and
productivity (total output per worker). The use of
this firm performance variable is common in studies
investigating the effects of corruption (see Bai et
al. 2019; Bbaale & Okumu 2018; Cuervo-Cazurra
2016; Fisman & Svensson 2007; Jain 2020; Okumu
& Mawejje 2020).
Our main interest predictors are bribe payment and
IDI score as a proxy for institutional quality, specifically the quality of local democracy. Bribe payment
is a bribe to value-added ratio. We centered the IDI
score to the mean value to get more logical and
interpretable coefficients.
We followed Vial & Hanoteau (2010) by adding
three control variables in our estimation, namely
firm size (calculated by total worker log value),
nonproduction wage ratio (representing white col-
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lar/management service cost), and foreign ownership (dummy value 1 if foreign ownership is more
than 50%). By doing so, we obtained a comparable
estimation result of the corruption effect during and
after the Soeharto Era.

4. Result
4.1. Summary Statistics
IBS observations varied each year as a result of
firm entry and firm exit. There were 24,468 firms
in 2009; 23,345 in 2010; 23,370 in 2011; 23,592 in
2012; 23,698 in 2013; 24,529 in 2014; and 26,322
in 2015. The initial panel data consisted of 169.329
observations. After deleting irrational outliers and
missing values we retained 146,044 observations
derived from 28,861 firms.
The descriptive statistics show a declining trend of
bribe payment over time in terms of average payment, especially within firms that reported positive
bribe as shown in Figure 1. This phenomenon is
consistent with Kuncoro’s (2006) finding, showing
that increasing uncertainty decreases bribes, and
confirms the generally accepted theory that democratization correlates to lower corruption (Svensson
2005; Treisman 2000). The firms that reported positive bribe also declined during the 2009–2013 period but increased again in 2014 and 2015. We
speculate that the 2014 general election might have
contributed to this phenomenon.
Our data shows promising correlations between our
main variables of interest as shown in Table 2. First,
it shows that bribe payment correlates negatively
with output and productivity growth. We observe a
significant positive correlation between the quality
of democracy and firm performance, but it negatively correlates with bribe payments. This finding
resonates with prior studies that found that democracy is a conducive ground for economic activity
(Acemoglu et al. 2008) and suppresses corruption
(Fisman & Gatti 2002; Treisman 2000). We also
found a negative and significant relationship between firm size and bribes payment, indicating that

129

smaller firms are extorted more since the value
of bribes is relatively constant for all firms, a finding consistent with Henderson & Kuncoro’s (2004).
Lastly, we found an insignificant negative correlation
between FDI and bribes payment, which contradicts
Henderson & Kuncoro’s (2004) finding. One possible explanation is because foreign investors enjoy
more protection from the government.
Our empirical strategy utilizes bribe payment average and standard deviation within the industrylocation cluster as an instrumental variable. We set
up an industry-location cluster based on 766 fivedigit ISIC code and 445 districts within our dataset.
We were then able to obtain yearly bribes average and standard deviation of payment. We excluded the value of the observed firm when calculating the average to increase the exogeneity, a step
also employed in previous studies (e.g., Bbaale &
Okumu 2018; Fisman & Svensson 2007; Jain 2020;
Krammer 2019; Vial & Hanoteau 2010). Therefore,
there were two other firms within the cluster, so
we had to drop cluster observation with fewer than
three members. We also dropped singleton (i.e.,
observations that only appeared in one year). After
all of these steps, we retained 97,852 observations
and were ready to perform the industry-location
robust estimation.

4.2. Estimation Results
Table 3 displays the results of our first stage regression based on Equation (2). Firm bribes payment
was regressed upon instrument variables and control variables. Instruments’ validity test result displayed in Appendix B supports our strategy. The
instruments are not considered weak according to
Stock & Yogo (2005) critical value criteria.
The results show that a higher bribes payment average from the neighboring-same industry firms leads
to a higher observed firm’s payment. Conversely,
a deviation in bribes payment is also negatively
related to an individual firm’s payment. When uncertainty is high, firms draw away from bribes negotiation (Kuncoro 2006). Electricity sold that represents
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Output growth
Productivity growth
Bribes payment
(ratio to value added)
IDI score (centered)
Firm size (log)
Non production wage
(ratio to total wage)
Foreign ownership (dummy)
Source: Authors’ calculation

N
146044
146044
146044

Mean
0.119
0.125
0.004

SD
1.009
0.977
0.019

Min
-16.324
-16.306
0.000

Max
18.644
18.801
0.991

146044
146044
146044

0.000
4.227
0.195

7.216
1.203
0.196

-13.892
2.996
0.000

18.818
10.958
1.000

146044

0.087

0.282

0.000

1.000

Figure 1. Bribes Payment 2009–2015
Source: Calculated from Statistik Industri Besar Sedang – BPS-Statistics Indonesia

Table 2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix
Output
Productivity
growth
growth
Output growth
1.0000
Productivity growth
0.9182**
1.0000
Bribes payment
-0.0528**
-0.0433**
IDI score
0.0134**
0.0191**
Firm size
0.0437**
-0.0310**
Non Production Wage -0.0099**
-0.0130**
Foreign Ownership
-0.0101**
-0.0073**
Note: (**) represents 5% significance level;
Source: Authors’ calculation

Bribes
payment

IDI
score

Firm
size

Non Production
Wage

Foreign
Ownership

1.0000
-0.0133**
-0.0492**
0.0035
-0.0027

1.0000
0.0507**
0.0314**
0.0383**

1.0000
0.1691**
0.2939**

1.0000
0.1168**

1.0000

infrastructure dependency also shows a negative
relation to bribes payment made by an individual
firm. The less dependent a firm is, the less they will
pay bribes. Those relationships are statistically significant and seem intuitive, confirming the general
theory.
Table 4 presents the main estimation results. This
study estimates two dependent variables (output
and productivity growth) using the base specifica-

tion shown in Equation (3) and alternative specification which accounts for the interaction term as
expressed in Equation (4), the results are labeled
(1) and (2), respectively. OLS results are provided
in Appendix B.
Both the OLS and IV-TSLS results clearly show that
bribes payment hamper firm performance. In the
OLS estimation, the coefficients are around -3.5%.
The IV-TSLS estimation magnifies the result; one
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Table 3. First stage IV regression results
Bribes payment
0.28235***
(0.0561)
Bribes payment standard deviation
-0.07908***
(0.0209)
Sold Electricity (Kwh)
-4.99e-06*
2.82E-06
IDI Score (centered)
-2.55E-06
(0.0000183)
Firm size
-0.00146***
(0.0002)
Non Production Wage
0.00106
(0.0009)
Foreign ownership
0.00257
(0.0016)
Year control
YES
Observations
97.852
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***)
represent p<0.10, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation
Bribes payment mean

percent increase in bribes payment causes the firm
to fail to grow by 9.5% to 9.8% higher and to lower
its productivity growth by around 12.6%. That payment does not return in beneficial feedback; rather
it diverts resources away from productive use. The
effect is worsened by the endogeneity nature of
corruption; regulatory burden and delay are chosen by bribe-extracting bureaucrats, and firms that
pay more in bribes are also likely to spend more
management time and face a higher cost of capital
(Kaufmann & Wei 2000). This validates the KPPOD
finding on the muddy and harmful regional regulations for economic activity. The coefficients are
larger than Fisman & Svensson’s (2007) findings in
Uganda (-4.17 in the base model and -7.87 when
outliers were excluded), similar to Zhou & Peng’s
(2012) findings in the intercountry study (-9.23 to
-10.51), and smaller than Seker & Yang’s (2012)
findings in Latin America and the Caribbean (-24%
lower sales growth).
Our findings contradict Vial & Hanoteau’s (2010).
While they found bribes benefitted firms during the
Soeharto Era, we found that it is harmful in the Reformasi Era. Firms’ bribes payment average across
observations is 0.4%. Using the estimation coefficient (9.8 for output growth and 12.6 for productivity
growth), we calculated that on average, corruption
penalized firm growth by 3.92%, and productivity
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growth by 5.04% during our observation period.
The variable of IDI score delivers mixed results.
It predicts a positive relationship with firm performance but only statistically significant in productivity growth. It is not a strong predictor for output
growth. When we take the interaction term between
IDI score and bribes payment, it turns to a negative significant result, even with a very small coefficient. Several possible explanations could be
offered. First, as better education is strongly correlated with the quality of democracy in Indonesia
(Amri & Pasha 2020), more skilled workers may
deliver better productivity. However, the relationship
between the quality of democracy and manufacturing firm performance remains puzzling. On the other
hand, Amri & Pasha (2020) reported that manufacturing sector share within locality appears weakly
significant in the negative direction with the quality
of democracy, contrary to expectations under the
modernization thesis.
The interaction term between bribes payment and
democracy score delivers an interesting result. It
is only positive and statistically significant for output growth. It appears, while bribe does damage
growth, firms located in more democratic provinces
are less negatively affected. We use the mean to
center the IDI score, so the mean also acts as a
threshold. One-point increase from the mean in IDI
score – holding bribes payment constant, will neutralize the negative impact of the bribe by around
2.03%. Conversely, one-point decrease from the
mean in IDI score will increase the harm.
To better understand the estimation results, the following illustration is provided. The province with the
closest IDI score to the mean is Kepulauan Riau
in 2013 at 66.5 points. The effect of bribe payment
to output growth – holding other variables constant,
in Kepulauan Riau would be -9.84 (obtained from
-9.84 + 2.03*0, as Kepulauan Riau IDI centered
score was 0). In the same year, Banten Province
IDI score was 69.79, so the effect of bribe payment
would be -3.16 (obtained from -9.84 + 2.03*3.29).
A higher effect of bribe payment is expected in a
province with a lower IDI score. For example, Cen-
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Table 4. TSLS - IV regression results of bribes payment effect to firm performance, fixed effect
Output Growth
Productivity Growth
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Bribes payment (fitted value)
-9.50358**
-9.84125**
-12.59843***
-12.56610***
(3.7270)
(4.0949)
(3.9933)
(3.9803)
IDI Score
0.00138
-0.00694***
0.00179*
0.00226
(0.0010)
(0.0016)
(0.0010)
(0.0014)
Bribes payment * IDI Score (fitted value)
2.03431***
-0.11698
(0.2822)
(0.2538)
Firm size
0.36184***
0.35892***
-0.15849***
-0.15830***
(0.0128)
(0.0130)
(0.0121)
(0.0121)
Non Production Wage
-0.01354
-0.01686
-0.02696
-0.02679
(0.0369)
(0.0370)
(0.0374)
(0.0374)
Foreign ownership
0.00994
0.00690
0.02541
0.02556
(0.0437)
(0.0441)
(0.0454)
(0.0454)
Constant
-1.3904***
-1.3764***
0.8126***
0.8117***
(0.0623)
(0.0660)
(0.0623)
(0.0622)
Year control
YES
YES
YES
YES
Observations
97.852
97.852
97.852
97.852
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) represent p<0.10, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation

tral Java Province IDI score in 2013 was 60.84, so
the bribes payment effect would be -21.33 (obtained
from -9.8 + 2.03*-5.66).
Using the above elasticity we can illustrate the
effect on firm bribes payment in different localities. Suppose three firms paid the same 0.4% (our
bribe mean value) of bribes in those three different
provinces. The first firm in Kepulauan Riau province
would experience a reduction in growth by 3.94%,
while the second firm in Banten would undergo a
growth reduction of only 1.26%. Another firm located in the worst scoring province, Central Java,
would suffer more in growth reduction by 8.5%. This
is a generalization from our predictive coefficient
and average value. The real effect on each firm
would certainly vary.
One may wonder why when interacted with bribe
payment, different levels of democratic quality may
produce different results, more specifically why better democratic quality mitigates the negative effect
of bribes and vice versa. We try to offer some possible explanations. First, the theory postulates that
firms bribe to reduce harassment or hedge against
bad policy. It has been validated in the Indonesian
context, cumbersome regulations (e.g., red tape,
harassment) are a strong predictor of bribery or
corruption (Henderson & Kuncoro 2004; Riyanto et

al. 2008). The formula of cumbersome regulations
is low participation, low transparency, and dysfunctional democracy institution, both legislative and
executive (Riyanto et al. 2008). IDI score is built
as an antithesis of those. Better public participation, transparency in decision making, and functioning democratic institution will ensure better quality
of democracy and IDI scores. Therefore, in a relatively good quality of democracy, firms are less
harassed by bad regulations and able to operate
more smoothly. In this setting, bribes may act only
as “gift relationship” to maintain firm legitimacy and
good relation with bureaucrats and local politicians.
This may be less harmful since there is an established institution to prevent extortion or harrasment
by means of combersome regulations which are
more pervalent in regions with low democratic quality.
Our second explanation is related to the disciplining
effect, the main feature of democracy. In a functioning democracy, public control and political competition are relatively tighter (Fisman & Gatti 2002).
Therefore, it is logical to placate the business sector by delivering the promised service and reducing
harassment.
The last possible explanation concerns the initial
firm location decision and inter-jurisdiction competi-
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tion. The firm is rational; as long as the degree of
uncertainty is manageable and the net benefit is
positive, they will proceed with the bribing (Kuncoro
2006). A high level of corruption does not always
deter investors. Some investors who have been exposed to bribery before may seek localities where
corruption is prevalent because they have already
developed the art to best deal with bribery (CuervoCazurra 2006).
Related to selection bias, on the next step we
dropped extreme values. Since we could not find
any justification for outliers, we used Stata to help
us identify extreme values. We dropped observations with output growth above or below 500%. The
estimation results show a very slight difference compared to our base estimation. We then added control variables (export share, industrial park location,
and government ownership) which may explain firm
output and productivity growth. Doing so results in
an even bigger magnitude of bribery impact (estimation results presented in Appendix C).
The use of IDI score bears some issues. It is a composite index constructed from many other variables
and may contain measurement error. To remedy
this error, referring to Gujarati (2004, p. 527) we
predict IDI variables using proxy variables. We use
literacy rate (literacy rate for the population aged 15
and over) and urbanization (% population living in
urban area) as these two are strong predictors of
IDI based on Amri & Pasha (2020). However, this
strategy yielded no fruitful results since the coefficient produced is far beyond meaningful results,
while the negative direction remains consistent (estimation results presented in Appendix C).
Therefore, this study assumes that the measurement error is random and the estimation result is
unbiased and consistent. We rely on the fact that
IDI aggregate score and trend pattern are relatively
consistent compared to other international indices
such as V-Dem (Amri & Pasha 2020). Furthermore,
there may be some criticisms of IDI reliability and
potential bias (see Amri & Pasha 2020 for further
discussion). However for now, we use the IDI score
since there are no better alternatives of local democ-
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racy measurement available in Indonesia and acknowledge this as one of the limitations of our study.

5. Conclusion
We have shown how corruption is harmful to manufacturing firms in Indonesia, notably signaling that
the greasing effect once it had during the Soeharto
Era has now diminished. Using robust estimation,
our estimation displays the detrimental effect of
bribery on the growth and productivity of manufacturing firms. Given the average firm growth during
the observation period of 11.9%, brought about by
corruption, Indonesian manufacturing firms missed
the potential to grow over 20%.
Indonesia is in a critical condition and must act to
solve its long-standing corruption issue. As many
previous studies have argued, red tape and cumbersome regulations are the main cause of corruption; therefore, efforts to eradicate corruption
should target this area. President Joko Widodo appears to be well aware of this. In 2016 he formed a
task force aimed to exterminate bribery and illegal
levies, known as Satgas Sapu Bersih Pungutan Liar
– Saber Pungli, which translates to Illegal Levies
Eradication Task Force. While one can contest the
Task Force’s effectiveness, this problem acknowledgment is an important start.
Furthermore, Indonesia could take another route
to address this issue. Improving the quality of local
democracy is a potentially effective strategy according to our findings. Having better local democracy
may kill two birds with one stone. First, as many
studies suggest, better democracy correlates with
lower corruption. Second, when corruption still occurs, we argue it appears less harmful to firms.
This action can be translated into improving transparency and public participation since these two are
an important aspect of democracy that correlates
to regulation quality (Riyanto et al. 2008).
Our novel contribution lies in the use of micro-level
data on corruption, which has rarely been a feature
in previous studies. We combine more than 28,000
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firms and yearly data on the quality of local democracy. This allows us to analyze the inter-jurisdictions
corruption effect. Our novel finding also contributes
to the literature that concerns the relationship between democracy or institutional quality and corruption. However, our work has several limitations.
First, this study relies on IDI which potentially contains carry-over errors in the construction process.
Second, this study employs a proxy to measure
bribes payment, which has to be used with caution.
Furthermore, some of the phenomena are still subject to further explorations. The effect of democracy
on firm performance appears to be somewhat still
puzzling. The result requires careful interpretion
since there are many possible connections. The
threshold effect of bribes can also be approached
using other methods. Some other local characteristics such as norms and culture may also contribute
to the effect of bribery, and these can be further
explored in future studies.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics
Table A1. IDI score 2009–2015
Sorted Largest to Smallest by Mean
PROVINCE
KALIMANTAN UTARA*
DKI JAKARTA
DI YOGYAKARTA
SULAWESI UTARA
BALI
KALIMANTAN TIMUR
NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR
SUMATERA SELATAN
KALIMANTAN TENGAH
KALIMANTAN BARAT
RIAU
KEP. BANGKA BELITUNG
JAMBI
LAMPUNG
GORONTALO
KEP. RIAU
SULAWESI TENGAH
SULAWESI BARAT
BANTEN
KALIMANTAN SELATAN
BENGKULU
MALUKU
JAWA TENGAH
JAWA BARAT
SULAWESI SELATAN
MALUKU UTARA
ACEH
PAPUA BARAT
SUMATERA UTARA
JAWA TIMUR
SUMATERA BARAT
SULAWESI TENGGARA
PAPUA
NUSA TENGGARA BARAT

MEAN
80.16
78.30
74.97
74.43
73.85
72.87
72.75
72.72
72.49
72.35
69.65
69.41
68.91
68.90
68.34
68.29
68.16
67.97
67.86
67.78
67.58
67.36
66.75
66.21
65.77
63.80
63.55
63.52
63.45
62.17
62.10
60.87
60.63
59.09

S.DEV
0.00
4.80
5.41
5.55
2.99
4.81
2.68
3.97
5.35
4.95
3.11
3.09
2.52
3.60
6.00
3.34
4.76
4.03
4.18
4.34
5.22
3.77
5.06
5.73
5.41
3.37
6.10
2.70
4.07
7.85
3.97
6.55
1.87
3.30

2015
80.16
85.32
83.19
79.40
79.83
81.24
78.47
79.81
73.46
76.40
65.83
72.31
70.68
65.95
76.77
70.26
76.67
68.25
68.46
74.76
73.60
65.90
69.75
73.04
67.90
61.52
67.78
59.97
69.01
76.90
67.46
69.44
57.55
65.08

2014
84.70
82.71
83.94
76.13
77.77
68.81
74.82
79.00
80.58
68.40
75.32
71.15
71.62
73.82
68.39
74.36
76.69
75.50
70.84
71.70
72.72
77.44
71.52
75.30
67.90
72.29
65.65
68.02
70.36
63.99
70.13
62.15
62.62

2013
71.18
72.36
73.11
72.22
68.13
73.29
67.12
64.15
67.52
68.37
68.79
64.41
63.13
67.21
66.50
64.50
64.02
69.79
63.71
59.17
66.23
60.84
65.18
65.20
64.06
63.56
60.70
58.80
59.32
54.11
52.61
60.92
57.22

2012
77.72
72.96
76.50
71.75
71.23
72.67
73.17
65.78
65.38
67.00
69.37
68.81
72.26
59.37
65.61
64.97
63.65
65.29
61.13
61.70
59.68
63.79
57.05
68.55
66.83
54.02
65.70
58.51
54.99
60.82
57.26
60.71
57.97

2011
77.81
71.67
71.19
74.20
66.37
72.34
67.92
76.28
74.86
70.65
67.13
70.46
74.08
62.77
70.78
64.00
66.36
67.37
66.47
71.36
68.38
65.59
66.18
65.31
59.17
55.54
61.78
66.15
55.98
65.02
57.56
59.05
54.49

2010
77.44
74.33
65.94
72.44
73.04
72.05
73.65
71.10
69.32
71.45
65.94
65.88
67.80
64.97
62.89
66.63
68.82
60.60
70.94
70.78
69.51
63.42
59.41
56.67
59.92
65.36
67.75
63.45
55.12
63.04
54.79
60.26
58.13

2009
73.91
67.55
70.94
70.35
72.31
71.64
72.52
77.63
72.38
75.85
67.01
71.00
67.47
73.50
73.61
66.02
67.99
67.98
66.63
64.76
69.07
66.45
71.07
61.48
67.21
66.29
63.06
60.20
62.49
60.29
64.29
63.80
58.12
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Appendix B. OLS Result and IV Validity Test
Table B1. OLS Result, Fixed Effect

Bribes payment
IDI Score
Bribes payment * IDI Score
Firm size
Non Production Wage
Foreign ownership
Constant
Year control
Observations
Source: Authors’ calculation

Output Growth
(1)
(2)
-3.57868*** -3.66230***
(0.4526)
(0.4428)
0.00138
0.00098
(0.0010)
(0.0010)
0.10653*
(0.0577)
0.37064***
0.37031***
(0.0103)
(0.0103)
-0.01987
-0.0201
(0.0337)
(0.0336)
-0.00492
-0.00625
(0.0372)
(0.0372)
-1.45848*** -1.45646***
(0.0447)
(0.0447)
YES
YES
97,852
97,852

Productivity Growth
(1)
(2)
-3.54824*** -3.59427***
(0.4424)
(0.4267)
0.00179*
0.00157
(0.0010)
(0.0010)
0.05865
(0.0631)
-0.14506***
-0.14523***
(0.0093)
(0.0093)
-0.03664
-0.03676
(0.0333)
(0.0333)
0.00271
0.00198
(0.0364)
(0.0364)
0.70862***
0.70973***
(0.0406)
(0.0406)
YES
YES
97,852
97,852

Table B2. IV Validity Test
(1)
1

2

Under identification test
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):
Chi-sq(3) P-val:
Weak identification test
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:
10% maximal IV size
15% maximal IV size
20% maximal IV size
25% maximal IV size

Specification
(2)
(3)

(4)

35.516
0.0000

35.795
0.0000

35.516
0.0000

35.795
0.0000

130.577

131.255

130.577

131.255

22.30
12.83
9.54
7.80

22.30
12.83
9.54
7.80

22.30
12.83
9.54
7.80

22.30
12.83
9.54
7.8 0

Source: Authors’ calculation
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Appendix C. Robustness Check
Table C1. TSLS - IV Regression Results, Extreme Values Excluded
Output Growth
Productivity Growth
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Bribes payment
-9.08992***
-9.43963**
-12.29427***
-12.25981***
(3.4711)
(3.8142)
(3.7204)
(3.7038)
IDI Score
0.00077
-0.00706***
0.00118
0.00176
(0.0009)
(0.0014)
(0.0009)
(0.0013)
Bribes payment * IDI Score
1.91345***
-0.14105
(0.2619)
(0.2361)
Firm size
0.33862***
0.33593***
-0.17412***
-0.17390***
(0.0120)
(0.0121)
(0.0114)
(0.0114)
Non Production Wage
-0.02354
-0.02664
-0.03440
-0.03418
(0.0351)
(0.0352)
(0.0357)
(0.0357)
Foreign ownership
0.00443
0.00165
0.01880
0.01898
(0.0401)
(0.0405)
(0.0421)
(0.0421)
Year control
YES
YES
YES
YES
N
97601
97601
97601
97601
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) represent p<0.10, p<0.05
and p<0.01, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation

Table C2. TSLS - IV Regression Results, Control Variable Added
Output Growth
Productivity Growth
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Bribes payment
-15.05397*** -15.24026***
-17.58115*** -17.35855***
(4.8939)
(4.9160)
(5.1237)
(5.0270)
IDI Score
0.00299*
0.00100
0.00397**
0.00575**
(0.0015)
(0.0023)
(0.0015)
(0.0023)
Bribes payment * IDI Score
0.50442
-0.44831
(0.4211)
(0.4211)
Firm size
0.23538***
0.23444***
-0.16979***
-0.16887***
(0.0164)
(0.0164)
(0.0166)
(0.0165)
Non Production Wage
-0.04399
-0.04399
-0.04079
-0.04094
(0.0524)
(0.0525)
(0.0536)
(0.0535)
Foreign ownership
-0.00289
-0.00340
0.01084
0.01125
(0.0513)
(0.0514)
(0.0530)
(0.0529)
Export Output
-0.00000
-0.00000
0.00001
0.00001
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Government Share
0.12659
0.12749
0.17656**
0.17573**
(0.0840)
(0.0839)
(0.0834)
(0.0833)
Located in Industrial Park
-0.07780***
-0.07601***
-0.07905***
-0.08067***
(0.0173)
(0.0173)
(0.0173)
(0.0173)
Year control
YES
YES
YES
YES
N
50751
50751
50751
50751
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) represent p<0.10, p<0.05
and p<0.01, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation
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Table C3. IV-TSLS Estimation Result, IDI Score Instrumented
Output Growth
Productivity Growth
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Bribes payment
-46.04859** -48.92128**
-60.04273** -57.36684**
(22.8037)
(21.1725)
(28.1162)
(23.5699)
Instrumented IDI Score
0.00840***
0.00617**
0.00787***
0.00954***
(0.0022)
(0.0029)
(0.0024)
(0.0032)
Bribes payment * Instrumented IDI Score
0.39636
-0.29274
(0.4943)
(0.5591)
Firm size
0.33467***
0.33052***
-0.24989***
-0.24595***
(0.0395)
(0.0375)
(0.0477)
(0.0412)
Non Production Wage
0.01188
0.01449
0.00723
0.00465
(0.0650)
(0.0662)
(0.0766)
(0.0729)
Foreign ownership
0.14473
0.14976
0.20861
0.20301
(0.1123)
(0.1151)
(0.1383)
(0.1298)
Year control
YES
YES
YES
YES
N
82959
82959
82959
82959
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) represent p<0.10, p<0.05 and p<0.01,
respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation

Table C4. First Stage IDI Estimation Result
Dependent Variables
Urban population

IDI Score
-0.237***
(0.0095)
Literacy
4.456***
(0.0220)
_cons
-338.56752***
(1.7228)
N
84198
r2
0.51219
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(*), (**) and (***) represent p<0.10,
p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation
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